The influence of industrial structure, more specifically of business ownership, is investigated on the level of unemployment in Japan. The question is to what extent business ownership, i.e., entrepreneurship can reduce the level of unemployment. The alleged differences between the managed and the entrepreneurial economy will be discussed as well as the links between entrepreneurship and unemployment. It will be concluded that Japan is hardly an outlier when using a simple model of the relationship between unemployment and the rate of business ownership. The model is calibrated using recent data of some 23 OECD countries. It shows a minor underestimation of the rise in unemployment in Japan in the period 1988-2000. Some arguments are brought forward why this might be the case.
Introduction
Japan has historically had both a very high degree of business ownership and very low levels of unemployment. Moreover, a very large share of the Japanese workforce is employed in small and medium size enterprises. Since the beginning of the 1990s this situation changed abruptly and Japan entered a prolonged period of economic stagnation known as the lost decade during which Japan experienced very low to no growth. During this period business ownership levels declined dramatically and unemployment levels more than doubled within one decade. These developments contrast a general trend towards a more entrepreneurial economy that can be observed in many other OECD countries. Amidst strong government efforts to revive the Japanese economy through increased entrepreneurship, many observers fear its economy is heading for a second decade of stagnating growth and growing unemployment.
The economies of developed countries are in a transition from a state in which massproduction was the mainstay of business to an economy in which knowledge intensive activities form the cornerstone of economic activity. Audretsch and Thurik refer to this process as the transition from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy. In the managed economy technological trajectories were relatively well-defined and hence firms were subject to relatively low uncertainty in planning their R&D activities. Stability, continuity and homogeneity were the cornerstones of the managed economy . Firms focused on the exploitation of scale economies and competed on operational efficiency. In the developed economies of the West, firms were confronted with the dilemma of high transaction costs which led both horizontal and vertical integration. In the case of Europe and the U.S. the economic structure most conducive to growth favored the dominance of large firms and for three decades their economies experienced an increasing concentration of business.
Modern technology has lowered transaction costs and moved the advantage away from firms toward markets and the individual as the smallest possible firm . Not only the advent of the knowledge economy contributed to this move (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000) but also that of modern organizational forms like networks and other loose alliances and relationships (Nooteboom, 1999) . Changes in the direction of technological progress, along with changes in the world economy, resulted in a structural shift affecting the economies of all industrialized countries. Piore and Sable (1984) argue that the instability of markets in the 1970s resulted in the demise of mass production and promoted flexible specialization. This fundamental change in the path of technological development led to the occurrence of vast diseconomies of scale as a consequence of falling transaction costs. In other words it led to a new economy. Audretsch and Thurik (2000) refer to this economy as the entrepreneurial economy. Several studies have shown (see that entrepreneurship and the associated dynamism have a strong and positive effect on economic growth. The capacity of an economy to renew itself through a process of creative destruction as had been advocated by Schumpeter is increasingly being considered crucial to economic progress in advanced economies.
Japan's experience in the post-war period contrasts with the developments in Europe and the United States. Confronted with an economy that had been devastated by World War II the Japanese started out with a considerable backlog in technological capability and know-how. However, they managed to catch up with their Western competitors in only a few decades and subsequently became a role model of economic development for other countries in the region. As a relative late comer Japan was following a clear path of technological development that had been set out by its western competitors. Japan's competitiveness originated from its firms' ability to quickly absorb technological know how imported from notably the U.S. and subsequently refining this technology and producing a wide variety of products. Japanese firms also managed to achieve superior levels of operational efficiency through the exploitation of scale economies.
The organizational approach of Japanese firms followed a completely different trajectory than could be observed in Western firms. The trade-off for firms in the managed economy had always been the classic "make or buy decision"; i.e. buy a product on the market or produce it within the firm when risks or transaction costs are high (see Williamson, 1975) . Western firms grew in size through vertical integration of the production hierarchy and horizontal mergers to exploit economies of scale. This led to increased concentration of business in the U.S. and Europe. The Japanese challenged this classic trade-off by employing alternative modes of production that relied on inter-corporate relations that allowed larger firms to cooperate closely with small firms without actually integrating them into the firm. This unique approach to production, which has become widely known as the keiretsu model, resulted in an industrial structure of several business conglomerates of large businesses floating atop a vast number of smaller subcontractors that supplied their parent firms with parts and intermediates. The nature of this relationship can be described as hierarchical and it cannot be said that these small firms were truly entrepreneurial in the sense that they were autonomous producers. Instead, keiretsu parent firms exercise control through a network of informal relations that enables them to maintain flexibility without losing control over the supply chain.
The turning point of the 1970s, described by Audretsch and Thurik (2000 and , has had important consequences for Japan's competitive position. The superior operational efficiency of Japanese firms has slowly eroded as other countries in Asia expanded their production capacity and technological ability. Japanese firms responded to this global change by increasingly relocating their production to low cost countries. For Japan's small business sector this development has been devastating as many small firms suddenly saw their orders moving oversees to low-cost producers. Some firms have managed to make the transition to this new situation either by relocating their own production capacity overseas or by focusing on specialized or high tech products. However, a vast majority of the small business sector is struggling for survival and many firms have already ceased to exist. The Schumpeterian paradigm of creative destruction has led in Japan to a situation where the old subcontracting firms are faced with widespread destruction, but where the creation of new firms has not yet taken off.
In the present study we investigate the influence of industrial structure, more specifically of entrepreneurship, on the level of unemployment in Japan. The question is to what extent entrepreneurship, i.e., business ownership can reduce the level of unemployment. In section 2 we start our investigation with a short discourse on the history of economic development in Japan and the restructuring process of the 1990s. In section 3 we address the link between unemployment and business ownership and in section 4 we present our results. In the remaining sections we discuss the peculiarities of the Japanese situation and show how the Japanese economy is undergoing structural change.
Discussion of the modern economy in Japan
The performance of an industrial structure, measured in terms of economic growth, is shaped by the degree to which the industrial structure utilizes scarce resources most efficiently. The most efficient industrial structure does not alter in case its underlying determinants are stable. Chandler (1990) , Scherer and Ross (1990) and Dosi (1988) conclude that a change in the underlying economic determinants will result in a change in the industrial structure most conducive to growth.
The actual industrial structure of a country is determined by its specific cultural, institutional and economic background. Therefore, we can expect to encounter diversity among countries and find that some countries will be more successful than others in changing their economic structure to facilitate growth. The superior economic performance of the Japanese economy in the '50s and '60s originated to a large degree from such cultural and institutional aspects of Japanese society. Attempts to implement elements of this model in other countries without a similar cultural and institutional background have therefore never achieved the same degree of success. To understand the current process of industrial restructuring in Japan we provide a short historic overview of some events that laid the foundations for the economic structure we encounter today and we emphasize the role of entrepreneurship. In our discourse of Japan's modern economy we will stress two features of Japan's economic structure. That is, 1) the dual structure of Japanese industry and 2) the importance of the organization as an allocation mechanism of resources in the economy.
The dual structure of Japanese industry
The foundations of Japan's dual structure were laid during the early stages of Japan's economic development in the Meiji era that started in 1868. The Meiji era saw Japan opening up to the rest of the world after nearly three centuries of seclusion. Naturally the sudden inflow of foreign ideas and technology marked the starting point of rapid growth and industrialization. Private entrepreneurship was one of the important mechanisms for implementing foreign technology in production processes, but the Meiji government was careful enough only to provide assistance to established merchant entrepreneurs with close contacts to the government and who's objectives converged closely with the intentions of the government. Japan's smaller entrepreneurs were confronted with more harsh conditions. Being looked down upon, they did not have direct access to foreign technology. This led small business owners to improve efficiency through continued experimentation with technologies that spilled over from the larger merchant entrepreneurs. In spite of being neglected these entrepreneurs managed to expand their business rapidly in the traditional and light industries.
The growing power of the merchant entrepreneurs and the increasing scale of their operations, stimulated by the government, led to an oligopolistic economic structure in which large manufacturers pushed the small business sector in unadvantageous subcontracting relations. The growing differential in wages, prices and working conditions between large and small enterprises became institutionalized in the zaibatsu model that already reflected the contours of what later would become known as the "dual structure" of Japan's economy. The end of World War II brought a short reverse of this course when allied command ordered the dissolvement of the prewar zaibatsu conglomerates and favored an industrial policy in which small firms were to have a more prominent position. However, under threat of the growing power of the communist world these policies were soon abandoned and the dual structure returned again. The government established the keiretsu group structure that was based on the old zaibatsu but stood under strong influence of the government bureaucracy. Independent small firms and their entrepreneurs again moved to the background of government attention, but they remained an important element in Japan's economic structure. In the following two decades the keiretsu structure was to become the dominant structure and a large share of small firms was again quickly absorbed within the subcontracting hierarchy.
We point to this historic development to demonstrate the long history and strong embeddedness of the dual structure in Japan. The institutional framework of the 1950s up to the 1970s strongly favored the keiretsu groups. The keiretsu were seen as the cornerstone of the economy by the government and accordingly received preferential treatment in terms of access to scarce resources. Moreover, the organization of the private sector with its hierarchical governance structure and strong ties between main banks and their keiretsu affiliates enabled large firms to pursue their own interests at the expense of their subcontractors. The consequence of the dual structure was that independent firms, operating outside the sphere of the keiretsu groups, were confronted with difficult access to the capital, labor and goods markets. The current process of restructuring is still hampered by the rigidity of these institutions that suited the keiretsu dominance.
The organization as a resource allocation mechanism
The second feature of Japan's economic structure we point to is the importance of the organization as a central resource allocation mechanism. While western firms consider the organizational mechanism as the primary means of allocation within the firm and the market mechanism as the allocation mechanism in the economy, this clear distinction does not apply to Japan's economic structure. The bipolar distinction between market and organization is substituted in Japan by "quasi market" and "quasi organizational" relations between firms (Imai & Itami 1984) . Large Japanese firms belong to horizontal clusters centered around a main bank. These corporate groups or kigyo shudan played an important role in the allocation of financial resources. The main banks were conducive to solving problems of information a-symmetry and contributed to long-term and low-cost financial stability. It is said that these qualities enabled Japanese firms to focus on long-term investment in the development of new technology.
Another aspect of the organizational approach to resource allocation is the organization of production through the vertical keiretsu structure. The vertical keiretsu consists of a pyramidic structure of a large firm at the top of a myriad of smaller subcontractors. The interfirm relations between subcontractors and parent firms have long been considered a source of competitive strength of the Japanese firm. These relations transcend simple market transactions and include a long-term commitment between both parties that include the exchange of employees, sharing of knowledge and technology and a stable flow of orders. While formally not under the control of their parent firm, subcontracting firms are subordinate to the strategic decision making at the top of the supply chain (see Cowling and Tomlinson, 2002) . Parent firms provide informal guidance to their suppliers with respect to production planning and technology development. Moreover, employees and entrepreneurs of these small subcontracting firms have strong commitment and association towards their parent firm. It is in this context that Japan's small firms have been referred to as quasi firms, indicating their limited independence from the larger keiretsu groups. Nevertheless, the mutual interdependence of firms was beneficial to both parties. The long standing relations between subcontractors and end producers enabled firms to cooperate in the development of new technology without sacrificing flexibility. Moreover, competition between subcontractors guaranteed low-cost production. Subcontractor firms benefited from the keiretsu framework because of the supply of low-interest capital through the keiretsu banks, credit guarantees provided by parent firms, access to advanced technology and know-how and a stable flow of orders.
The keiretsu production model reached its height in the 1970s when changing economic circumstances forced Japanese firms to carry out drastic rationalization. Production practices such as total quality control (kaizen) and just-in-time production (kanban) were adopted which enabled Japanese firms to achieve superior levels of operational efficiency. The two features of Japan's economic structure that we described above are elements of a generalized model of the Japanese firm that gained ground in the 1970s and 1980s
1 . In reality however, the Japanese firm as such has been the product of an evolution and firms have always adapted to new circumstances. The 1970s were in many respects a turning point for the success of the keiretsu model. The impact of the dollar crisis in 1971 and more manifestly the 1973 oil crisis revealed the strong dependence on imported energy and vulnerability to volatile markets. Firms responded by expanding into more knowledge intensive industries that would reduce dependence on energy sources. The superior efficiency of the keiretsu model still proved successful throughout the 1970s demonstrated by the global dominance that was achieved by Japanese firms in the electronics and machine tool industry. However, firms were slowly experiencing the impact that the knowledge economy would have on the competitiveness of Japanese firms but failed to take adequate steps to adapt to this new environment.
Critics of the dual structure thesis have argued that the real economic structure was much more pluralistic than the dual structure theorists had put forward. Nakamura 2 , one of the most outspoken critics during the 1970s, already envisioned that the knowledge economy would lead to a breakdown of existing economic structures and pointed to the existence of leading medium sized firms or chuken kigyo that would take over the role of the large keiretsu firms. Indeed a large proportion of Japan's small business sector was already operating as independent producers and did not engage in subcontracting. However, for independently operating firms business conditions have always been far worse. Market mechanisms were in many respects not well developed which translated into limited access for small firms to financial, human and technological resources.
We continue our account of Japan's economic history with a short summary of events of the last two decades. The intense rationalization and upgrading of technological capabilities among small firms that had taken place in the 1970s had narrowed the gap between small and large enterprises and at the start of the 1980s many small firms had reached equal technological sophistication. For some entrepreneurs this opened the way to a more independent existence and subcontracting rates slowly started to decrease during the 1980s. The steady growth during the 1980s put a lot of pressure on the labor market. For small firms it became difficult to attract qualified personnel on a tight labor market. The increased automation of production processes led to ever more efficient production. It became increasingly clear however, that there would be limits to efficiency improvements and that some adjustment was necessary. The 1990s also unveiled another problem that would put a break on continued high growth. Economic growth in Japan had always been facilitated by the backlog in technological capabilities which enabled progress through a process of catching-up. Since the 1970s the opportunities for catching-up were increasingly evaporating due to the fact that Japanese firms had turned from followers into leaders in technological knowledge and capability. The fundamental problem that this development presented to Japanese firms one where the technological trajectory had suddenly become undetermined. The realization that a more decentralized and diverse economic structure would be necessary to adapt to this new situation started to grow.
Overconfidence in the Japanese economy and an expansionary monetary policy led to an economic bubble of skyrocketing land and asset prices in the late 1980s. The subsequent collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s sent the financial sector into crisis. It would not take long until the troubles in the financial sector would spread to other sectors and the economy turned into a recession. Low to no growth, bad debts, sluggish demand followed by deflation in the late 1990s would characterize the rest of the decade. At the same time, more structural problems of the Japanese economy started to surface. Competitors in the East and Southeast Asian region, who had been ignored for some time, had been rapidly building up their productive capacity and upgrading their technological capabilities. Japanese firms had contributed themselves substantially to this development by channeling large flows of FDI to these countries. For Japan's subcontractors however this new competition presented a grave threat. Small firms that had depended on their keiretsu parent firm for decades suddenly saw their orders move overseas. Unable to compete on price with the new Asian competition and without experience in presenting themselves in the market, many of these firms started to face serious difficulties. Business closures in the manufacturing sector soared and the term hollowing out or kudoka was coined for the rapid weeding out of Japan's small business sector.
The 1990s are often referred to as Japan's lost decade. While in terms of economic performance the 1990s were indeed lost, the same cannot be said with respect to institutional change. The loss of confidence in the Japanese model and the struggling of both large and small businesses led to changes in industry that had been considered impossible before the burst of the bubble economy. Here we discuss just a few of these changes.
First of all, the bad financial health of the city banks led to a wave of mergers between main banks of different keiretsu groups. These mergers watered down the strong segregation between corporate groups that had existed up to then and opened the way for firms in the keiretsu hierarchy to widen the scope of their business. Secondly, cross shareholding within the keiretsu groups, which had always been a protective measure against hostile take-overs and the influence of stock holders, diminished. The case of Nissan Corporation, which was taken over by the foreign car manufacturer Renault in 1999, demonstrates the impact of this development. The new management of Nissan closed down production facilities and drastically reorganized Nissan's subcontracting structure. The radically different approach to corporate restructuring and lack of "Japanese social considerations" sent shockwaves through Japan's business community.
The impact of these developments on small firms varies. On the one hand a weeding out of Japan's subcontracting firms is taking place as many inefficient small firms do not find themselves able to survive in the harsher market conditions. On the other hand, other firms manage to make the transition to the knowledge economy by either moving their production facilities to low-cost locations in Asia or by upgrading their technological capability. The trend of decreasing subcontracting rates of the 1980s continued into the 1990s and among subcontractor firms a trend of divergence can be observed. While some firms intensify their relation to their main contractor and benefit from the advantages of the strong keiretsu relation, others pursue a strategy of becoming more independent through specialization and diversifying their markets. Both strategies turn out to improve profitability. In contrast, firms that pursue neither of these two strategies face the most difficulties in the continuation of their businesses (Whittaker, 2002) .
At the same time the success of small high-tech firms in the U.S. started to become an important source of inspiration for Japan's troubled business community. There were hopes that the so-called "Silicon Valley" model could revive Japan's economy. Elements of this "model" such as venture financing and high-tech start-ups started to trickle into the Japanese business world and there has been a steady professionalization of the venture capital market. The appreciation for the American model also induced a series of policies inspired on American legislation. The government started to encourage collaboration between business and university, implemented tax reforms to stimulate private investment in small firms and is fostering start-up firms through incubation centers and financing programs. These developments should however not be overestimated as venture capital still amounts to a very small share of investment and lags behind other countries considerably.
In the last two decades the perception of small firms as a fundamental strength for economic growth has grown considerably. The creation of new firms has become a national priority which is reflected in the new "Basic Law on SMEs" of 1999 that describes small firms no longer as weak but instead qualifies them as "a source of diverse and vigorous growth" (METI, 2002b) . Although voices critical of the keiretsu model could already be heard in the 1970s, the success of this same model had stood in the way of transition. With the heisei recession and perhaps more profoundly with the deepening of the recession in 1997 the need for change has become more imminent than ever. It is therefore disconcerting to see that the growing importance attributed to small firms has been paired with a decrease rather than an increase in the number of business owners in Japan.
Linking entrepreneurship and unemployment
The shift from a managed to an entrepreneurial economy has many facets and many consequences. Also, there are both conceptual and empirical indications that entrepreneurship enhances growth. The quintessential question now is whether, at the end of the day, the entrepreneurial economy leads to less unemployment than the managed one. In other words: the question is whether a rise in entrepreneurship leads to lower levels of unemployment.
The relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship has been shrouded with ambiguity. It is generally assumed that there is a two-way causation between changes in the level of entrepreneurship and that of unemployment: a "Schumpeter" effect of entrepreneurship reducing unemployment and a "refugee" or "shopkeeper" effect of unemployment stimulating entrepreneurship. Audretsch, Carree and Thurik (2001) try to reconcile the ambiguities found in the relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship. They present a two-equation model where changes in unemployment and in the number of business owners are linked to subsequent changes in those variables. Their model is based on a framework using elements of the Gibrat's Law literature. Their empirical results are from a dataset of 23 OECD countries over the period 1974 through 1998. This is the COMPENDIA (COMParative ENtrepreneurship Data for International Analysis) dataset constructed by EIM Business and Policy Research, Zoetermeer. See EIM (2003) . This dataset includes (un)employment and entrepreneurship figures for 23 OECD countries for the period 1972-2000. The COMPENDIA data also form the basis for the analysis and discussion in the subsequent section. Similarly, they provide the basis of an analysis of the entrepreneurship influence on unemployment is the UK and Spain, respectively. See Thurik (2003) and Thurik and Verheul (2003) .
In Audretsch, Carree and Thurik (2001) the existence of two separate relationships between unemployment and entrepreneurship is identified including significant "Schumpeter" and "refugee" effects. For the purpose of the present paper focusing on the case of Japan we deal with the "Schumpeter" side of the relationship. To test this first hypothesis that an increase in entrepreneurial activity leads to a decrease in subsequent unemployment Audretsch, Carree and Thurik (2001) estimate the following equation:
where U is the unemployment rate (unemployed per work force), E is the self-employment rate (business owners per work force) and e is a random coefficient. The index t refers to the year and L to the time lag. The expected sign of the coefficient b is negative. The lagged endogenous variable is used on the right hand side to "correct" for reversed causality. Weighted least squares using the number of self-employed is applied. They report values of the coefficients a, b and c of 0.004 (1.0), -0.78 (2.6) and -0.18 (2.1), respectively, with absolute tvalues between parentheses, given that a time lag is used of eight years, L=8 4 . Using an eight year time lag 46 data points are available. The relatively long lag structure of eight years is justified because the employment impact of entrepreneurship is not instantaneous but rather it requires a number of years for the firm to grow.
5 Coefficient b is less than zero and significant. This implies 3 The Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x causes y is to see how much of the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see whether adding lagged values of x can improve the explanation. y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged x's are statistically significant. Two-way causation is frequently the case; x Granger causes y and y Granger causes x. It is important to note that the statement "x Granger causes y" does not imply that y is the effect or the result of x. Granger causality measures precedence and information content but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term. 4 See Audretsch, Carree and Thurik (2001) for the results using a time lag of 4 and 12 years. 5 In this respect Geroski (1995, p. 148) states that "Even successful entrants may take more than a decade to achieve a size comparable to the average incumbent." Audretsch (1995) shows that share of total employment accounted for by that there exists a clear "Schumpeter" effect of entrepreneurship reducing unemployment. The negative effect of lagged unemployment on subsequent unemployment, c<0, is probably an indicator of cyclical effects related to the influence of policy measures. The small business sector, and hence business ownership, is generally assumed to be of considerable importance in modern OECD economies (White, 1982; Audretsch, 1995; Kwoka and White, 2001; Carree and Thurik, 2003) . New and small firms are a major vehicle in which entrepreneurship thrives (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999 ). The present exercise shows the importance of its role bringing down unemployment. In the next section we will present some computations as to how this works out in Japan.
Unemployment and entrepreneurship in Japan
In the present section we will discuss developments in unemployment in Japan in the period 1970 through 2000 as well as the development of entrepreneurship (share of business owners in the labor force). Lastly, we will discuss some results when applying equation (1) to Japan.
Developments in unemployment
Figure 1 presents the development of unemployment in the period between 1970 and 2000 for Japan and four other OECD countries: France, Germany, The Netherlands and the United States. These four countries are chosen as a benchmark because the development of entrepreneurship and its determinants is discussed extensively in Audretsch, Thurik, Verheul and Wennekers (2002) . Generally, the unemployment level in Japan has been considerably lower in the period between 1980 and 1998 than in the other countries. Only in the last years of the last century the Japanese unemployment level reached that of other OECD countries. The development of unemployment in Japan between 1970 and 2000 is characterized by less variation as compared to the other four countries. It increased from one percent in 1970 to two in 1990 whereas from then onwards it increased to five percent in 2000. The pronounced cyclical pattern of unemployment in most Western countries shows vehement increases in the early 1980s and early 1990s. These increases can also be observed in the Japanese case, although to a lesser extent.
a cohort of new-firm startups in U.S. manufacturing more than doubles as the firms age from two to six years old (no evidence was provided beyond six years). 
Developments in entrepreneurship
The developments in entrepreneurship in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and the United States are depicted in Figure 2 . 6 The pattern of the developments in entrepreneurship in Japan differs from that of the other countries: it is consistently higher until the mid 1990s. From Table 1 we see that there are only two large countries with a serious drop in the business ownership rate in the period 1986-2000: Japan and France. The development of entrepreneurship in several OECD-countries can be characterized by a U-shaped trend, with a decrease in entrepreneurship till the mid-eighties and an increase afterwards (Carree, Van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers, 2002; Audretsch, Thurik, Verheul and Wennekers, 2002) . At first sight the developments in the United States, Japan and France are not in conformity with this U-shaped pattern. However, although not visible in Figure 2 , the share of entrepreneurs in the United States declined until the early 1970s (Blau, 1987; Gartner and Shane, 1995) . The turning point of the development of entrepreneurship in the United States is in the early 1970s marking a period of increasing entrepreneurial activity. With respect to the developments in France there is some speculation that, although the role of entrepreneurship continued to decline into the late 1990s, entrepreneurship in France will increase in the near future, showing the U-shaped development, albeit one that is initiated at a later point in time. This prediction is justified by the fact that hindering factors, such as the interlock of government and regulations as well as the domination of large firms, are being reduced thereby paving the way for entrepreneurship (Henriquez, Verheul, Van der Geest and Bischoff, 2002) . Thus, whereas entrepreneurship in most OECD countries shows a U-shaped development, the periods of down-and upswing differ between countries. What appears to be a divergence is in fact a process of convergence (Audretsch, Thurik, Verheul and Wennekers, 2002) . The reversal of the downward to an upward trend marks the transformation from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000 and . As yet, in Japan there is no sign of this reversal. We will return to this phenomenon in one of the succeeding sections. In Table 1 a full picture is provided of business owners as a percentage of the labor force for the 23 OECD countries of which data are used when estimating equation (1). Observing Table 1 we can compare entrepreneurship in Japan with more countries than the four mentioned above. It is striking to see that, in comparison with the other OECD countries, the Mediterranean countries, including Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain, have a high level of entrepreneurship throughout the period between 1972 and 2000. These high levels of entrepreneurship do not necessarily imply that their contribution to employment and GDP is high since we have not corrected for the innovativeness of the entrepreneurs, i.e., we have made no distinction between "Schumpeterian" entrepreneurs and "shopkeepers" or "refugee" entrepreneurs. It is likely that entrepreneurs in the Mediterranean countries have different characteristics than entrepreneurs in, for instance, the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, the Mediterranean countries have a relatively low per capita income, accompanied by a more traditional industrial structure and different cultural settings. For instance, their populations show relatively high degrees of dissatisfaction Wennekers, Thurik, Noorderhaven and Hofstede, 2002) . This may have an important influence on the quantity and the quality of entrepreneurship in these countries. Other countries with a high level of business ownership are Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where Canada in particular shows a remarkable growth of more than five percent points in the entire period. There are only four countries with a more than one percent point decline in the 1986-2000 period: Japan is the largest country of these four showing the highest decline. The relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship
To determine whether and to what extent the contribution of entrepreneurship to reducing unemployment in Japan deviates from that in other countries we make use of equation (1) using L=6 where coefficients a, b and c are -0.001, -.75 and -.28, respectively. It is straightforward to calculate the estimated values of e for Japan in 1988, 1994 and 2000: they are 0.4 0.0 and 0.5 percent, respectively. In other words: the model represented by equation (1) fits rather well for the Japanese case with a minor tendency for underestimation. This underestimation could be explained by that the nature of entrepreneurship differs from other countries or that the economic and/or cultural setting in Japan differs from other countries so that variations in unemployment can be less adequately explained using equation (1). The implication of both hypotheses would be that more influences should be taken into account to explain unemployment. Both possibilities will be discussed in the next section. But we have to stress that the estimated residuals are relatively small. For instance, estimated residuals for the UK and Spain are considerably larger. See Thurik (2003) and Thurik and Verheul (2003) .
Using the results of equation (1) (1) for Japan. Hence, it has to be interpreted with care because earlier we concluded that Japan is a relative outlier in that the model shows a minor underestimation of the rise in unemployment in Japan. Other factors not included in the model probably play a role.
Business ownership in Japan
In our presentation of the development of the number of business owners across the OECD, Japan's development contrasts with that in other countries. While Japan had historically a very high degree of business owners up to the 1970s, the succeeding decades shows a steady decline of business ownership. The cause of this decline can be attributed to both an increase of business closures as well as a decline of new business starters. Figure 3 shows the start-up (Entry) and closure (Exit) rate of firms in Japan. As can be observed from figure 3 the number of business failures remained relatively stable throughout the 70s and 80s at about 3~4 %. The economic malaise that started with the burst of the bubble economy in the beginning of the 1990s sparked a strong rise in bankruptcies. A modest recovery followed in the mid 90s and fewer firms went out of business. Since 1997 the exit rate started to rise again and the most recent figures show the highest level of business closures in decades. Conversely, start-up activity has steadily decreased since the 1970s when the Japanese economy was still experiencing high growth. A detailed analysis of firm entry statistics in the White Paper on SMEs (METI, 2002a) suggests a continuing structural decline of the start-up rate since the collapse of the bubble economy. When we combine these developments of both entry and exit, we can observe that until the end of the 1980s the number of start-up enterprises still exceeded the number of closures showing an increase of total business owners. The beginning of the 1990s marked a turning point and the number of firms going out of business now exceeds the number of new firms being started. Hence, business ownership reversed to a downward trend.
In the current section we provide an insight in what happened to business ownership in Japan and present some rationale for these twin developments of (1) an increase of business closures and (2) a decreasing trend in start-up activity. We suggest that both developments ensue from a slow restructuring process of the keiretsu model of production.
Central to the concept of entrepreneurship is the willingness to take risk. This willingness in turn depends on cultural factors and a social environment that encourages people to take risks. In the case of Japan, the social environment is in general not supportive of entrepreneurs starting their own business. In a society that is characterized by a strong degree of risk aversity and emphasis on group loyalty, starting a business is often perceived as risky. A study by Yahagi & Isobe (2001) found that Japan ranks highest among a group of 21 countries (mostly OECD) in the public perception of the risks involved in starting a new business. The same study also showed that the appreciation of entrepreneurial qualities ranks lowest of all countries. Individuals who are willing to take risk will therefore in general not find much support and are more likely to get negative reactions for their "risky" behavior. These general cultural inclinations like risk aversity are fairly constant over time (Hofstede, 2001, p. 34) . The White Paper on SMEs reveals that the desire to become an entrepreneur has remained stable since the late 1970s when new firm creation was still high (METI, 2002a) . Therefore the drop in new firm creation since the 1990s presents a paradox and cannot be explained by cultural aspects alone.
The environment in which entrepreneurs operate has changed considerably since the 1960s and 1970s when the keiretsu structure was still the central modus operandi of Japanese business and here we find some explanation for the drop in new firm creation. The keiretsu structure was not only a production modus which was beneficial to large firms, small firms also benefited from this system owing to the support by their parent firms such as financial support through the main bank, assistance in the development of new technology and long-term stability in the form of a steady flow of orders. Parent firms were instrumental in creating an environment in which risks were reduced due to the stability and benefits of the subcontracting relation. The keiretsu system therefore, had a mitigating effect on the risks borne by individual entrepreneurs within the keiretsu group and this made it easier for risk-averse individuals to become business owners. Kawai & Urata (2002) provide evidence that subcontracting opportunities have a positive effect on small firm entry. The restructuring of Japan's industry and the less prominent role of the keiretsu firms in this new structure has led to the disappearance of the safe haven for small firms. It has however not yet been adequately replaced with an alternative institutional structure that encourages individuals to become entrepreneurs.
The impact of these changes can be exemplified by some of the most cited problems that start-up firms encounter as presented in the SME White Paper 2002 (METI, 2002a . The survey indicates that the most common problem for start-up firms is financial funding. Bank loans have always been the most common way to finance small businesses in Japan. Equity financing, such as venture capital, only accounts for a minor share of small business funding. Only 0.7% of Japanese businesses are funded with venture capital and Japan ranks lowest among all OECD countries in per capita venture capital investments (Reynold et al, 2001 ). This dependence on the banking system has led in recent years to some severe financing obstacles. Because of the strong bundling of interests between keiretsu conglomerates and their banks, small firms were the first to become the victim in the recent crises in the financial sector. The deepening of the crisis in 1997 led to a severe credit crunch that particularly hit hard on small firms. The second most cited problem was related to the establishment of business channels which indicates the difficulty of newcomers in the market to create relations with established firms in the market. The importance that is attached to long-term close relationships and the dependence on trust and reputation in Japan's business world stand in the way of a dynamic environment that is open to new entrants. The third most cited problem relates to the recruitment of skilled personnel and access to knowledge and business skills. Japanese employment practices such as life-time employment, seniority wages and internal labor market which prevailed particularly within the keiretsu structure are the cause of relatively low job mobility, particularly among mid-career employees. Access to this group of experienced employees by small firms is therefore limited. We will return to some of these aspects in the following sections in more detail.
As for the increasing rate of closures, the causes for the process of "hollowing out" are similarly related to the restructuring process described above. Small subcontracted firms in the manufacturing sector have long enjoyed a protective environment within the keiretsu framework. Competition was usually limited to Japanese competitors with comparable cost structures. Since the 1980s foreign competition has intensified with an expansion of low-cost production facilities and increased technological capabilities of East Asian competitors. To remain globally competitive, large firms saw no choice but to venture abroad. Since 1990 the recession had a more broad impact on the Japanese economy. It not only hit isolated sectors, large keiretsu firms also began to increasingly struggle and had to try to increase profitability by pressing suppliers or outsourcing to low-cost facilities abroad. For small firms that had depended on their parent firms for such a long period, the confrontation with this new reality is challenging to say the least. The effect of intense foreign competition, the weakening keiretsu ties and the complete lack of experience with presenting themselves on the market resulted in the strong rise of business closures. While other advanced economies are facing similar competition, the fact that Japan has a relative strong concentration of small businesses in medium-tech manufacturing industries that are vulnerable to the new competition in East Asia explains why the process of "hollowing out" has such a deep impact in the case of Japan.
The general pattern that can be observed here is that the protective environment of the keiretsu framework has weakened since the 1980s and made entrepreneurs increasingly dependent on the market. However, large businesses still exercise strong control over key areas of the economy which stands in the way of transition to a market economy that is more open to the small business sector.
Why is Business Ownership different in Japan?
We showed that the Schumpeter effect of entrepreneurship (i.e. the degree to which entrepreneurship contributes to employment creation) is less strong in Japan than the "average" of OECD countries. This implies that Japan's small firms are somehow different and are growing at a slower rate than firms in other countries. Why is this so? We present some rationale for why Japanese business ownership contributes less to employment creation than we would expect from our observations across the OECD. It needs to be stated that unemployment has always been very low in Japan which led to a very tight labor market in the 1980s. Small firms and particularly firms in the manufacturing sector were actually experiencing a shortage of skilled personnel during this period which resulted in increasingly high labor costs (Genda & Rebick, 2000) . The response of many small firms was to switch to labor saving techniques, resulting in automation of production processes. Therefore the limited contribution to employment creation by the small business sector during the 1980s should be seen in a positive light as a reaction to an overheated labor market. In this section we will focus primarily on changes in unemployment in the 1990s. We showed that Japan showed a minor underestimation of the Schumpeter effect of business ownership in the years 1988, 1994 and 2000. We will discuss some particularities of Japan's small business sector that might explain why business ownership has contributed less to employment creation in comparison to other OECD countries.
In the previous section we already pointed to the financial sector as an obstacle for new firm creation. We will discuss here why the financial sector is also an impediment for fast growth of small firms. The central role of banks as the main provider of capital renders small firms dependent on the assessment criteria employed by the banks. In Japan such criteria show a strong emphasis on collateral requirement and credit guarantees to secure repayment. Economic evaluations based on future cash-flows and the assessment of business plans are of secondary importance. The crisis in the financial sector and the non-performing loans situation are likely to have made banks even more stringent in their assessments. This focus on securing outstanding loans generally leads to a pre-selection of stable low-risk investments. High potential firms that have a larger impact on employment creation, but are unable to meet collateral requirements, are more likely to be turned down by banks. It is also said that the government subsidized financial loan programs, which amount to 8% of all small firm loans, are subject to the same selection bias of low-risk, low-return investment.
The main bank system that enabled low-cost, long-term investment served as a competitive strength because of its ability to solve problems of information asymmetry. But as the technological trajectory of the Japanese economy has become less determined, market opportunities became more pluriform. As a result the advantage of the main bank system in identifying investment opportunities has eroded and financial markets have gained importance in selecting high growth firms. However as we mentioned before, financial markets are not yet well developed. Banks lack expertise in evaluating business plans and the availability of risk capital is limited. Moreover, the financial health of banks depends on the survival of the larger keiretsu firms and protection of their interests in these firms will prevail over new investment in high-risk firms.
Firms need to raise equity capital in order to continue growth of their business either informally or through financial markets. For firms funded by venture capital this step is particularly important, as their financiers want to cash in on their investments after a few years time. Japanese financial markets have employed strict listing requirements in the past making it very hard for young firms to acquire capital on the market. This may explain why Japanese venture firms take relatively long to go public on financial markets compared to their American counterparts (METI, 2000) . This situation changed in the latter half of the 1990s when both the Osaka and Tokyo stock exchanges opened new markets and relaxed listing requirements that opened up a wider range of available financing options for small firms. However for most of the 1990s, a range of obstacles has stood in the way of both establishment and growth of small firms in Japan.
Japan's Entrepreneurs
Besides the factors we discussed above, which can be considered "enabling" factors that provide the entrepreneur with the means to start and expand an enterprise, other factors such as the characteristics of business owners are also an important determinant of the success of new firms. A relation exists between the expansion rate of a new firm and the ambitions of the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur's goal is merely to provide himself with a source of income, we can expect the firm to have only limited growth potential. On the other hand, if an entrepreneur is pursuing a "golden' opportunity the entrepreneur is more likely to be ambitious and put more effort in expanding his or her firm.
Evidence on the motives of entrepreneurs in Japan to start their business presents a mixed result. One recent survey found that entrepreneurs in Japan are mostly motivated by more "idealistic" factors such as the desire to work independently or self fulfillment (METI, 2002a) . This suggests that growth of the firm is not a main priority for most entrepreneurs. Another survey on the motives of entrepreneurs indicated that push factors play a major role in the decision of Japanese entrepreneurs to start their firm (Reynolds et al, 2001) . Japanese entrepreneurs start their businesses predominantly because they see no better opportunities for work. This high rate of entrepreneurship out of necessity suggests that the "refugee" effect of unemployment may play an important role in Japan. In a study by Harada (2002) a similar conclusion is drawn in the sense that a positive relation is found between the unemployment rate on the one hand and the number of people who wish to start their own business (i.e. aspiring entrepreneurs). The scarce evidence that exists on motivation of entrepreneurs in Japan shows that the pursuit of economic opportunity is a secondary motivation for many entrepreneurs.
If this refugee effect is a major motivation for entrepreneurs, we can indeed expect unemployment or the prospect of becoming unemployed to be a driving force for people to start their own business. Figure 4 shows the age composition of the unemployed in 4 selected countries: Japan, the U.S., France and the U.K. The curve representing the composition of the unemployed in Japan shows a relative Ucurve with high unemployment concentrated in the younger and older age cohorts. Unemployment rates for prima-aged employees have remained relatively low and stable through-out the 1990s and only started to rise after 1997. Besides low unemployment levels, prime-aged employees also show low job mobility. This middle age group of 25 to 40 year old people is the most promising group of would-be entrepreneurs. They have accumulated business skills and built up know-how in their career. Young unemployed who are pushed to start a firm are less capable, especially in Japan, where on-the-job and company training have always been an important source of skill formation. For the older age cohorts, the motivation to expand an enterprise may be weaker and their knowledge of modern technology and demand is less developed. The scarce evidence on the characteristics of Japanese entrepreneurs suggests that economic opportunities are not the main reason for starting an enterprise. As well as that Japanese entrepreneurs may lack business and technical skills due to lack of experience.
Employment situation is different in Japan
The weak Schumpeter effect of business ownership on unemployment can be linked to the nature of entrepreneurship in Japan, but can also be attributed to the particular nature of the employment situation in Japan. It needs to be said that small firms are not a major source of personnel reductions, but instead they contributed substantially to employment creation during most of the 1990s. Employment in the small business sector only started to decline after 1997 when the heisei recession deepened and business closures increased sharply. The main source of reductions in personnel is the larger enterprises that implemented substantial cutbacks in employment from the beginning of the 1990s.
The Japanese labor market is characterized by relatively low job mobility which is the result of Japanese employment practices that prevail in the larger enterprises. These employment practices such as life-time employment, seniority wages and limited ports of entry to employment in large firms provide strong incentives to employees not to change jobs in mid-career. In contrast, employment practices in smaller firms are more dynamic and labor mobility is much higher. Small firms rely on hiring mid-career job changers to attract well educated and trained employees. The life-time employment and seniority wage system are said to be dissipating, but factual inquiry reveals that job tenures in large enterprises have actually increased during most of the 1990s (Genda and Rebick, 2000) . Prime-aged employees still enjoy relative strong job security due to strong legal protection and the fact that mid-career employees are in a good position to secure their position within the firm. This group shows both low unemployment rates as well as low labor mobility. Personnel reductions in large firms have mainly taken place through a reduction of new hires as well as reducing the number of older employees through redeployment to affiliate firms and involuntary separations. The result of these employment adjustment methods is that the composition of the unemployed is roughly composed of redundant older employees and inexperienced young graduates.
The Schumpeter effect suggests that the growth of entrepreneurial firms would contribute to a reduction in unemployment. In Japan this dynamic is hindered by the rigidity of the employment system that limits small firms' access to experienced employees. Small firms that want to expand are experiencing a shortage of skilled and experienced personnel even though unemployment is rising. Genda and Rebick (2000) show that during the 1990s vacancies have actually increased in periods of rising unemployment levels, suggesting a mismatch on the labor market. Mismatches in the labor market can be observed with respect to both age and industries. Small firms need well trained and experienced personnel that have acquired specialized skills. The fact that unemployment is concentrated in the young and older age cohorts and that mid-career employees of large enterprises are still strongly attached to their employers, obstructs small firms' access to skilled personnel. In addition, personnel reductions have occurred mainly in medium-tech manufacturing firms while growth of new firms during the 1990s has mainly taken place in the service and high-tech sectors where other skills are required.
Japan's economic system has always attracted much admiration for sustaining very low levels of unemployment even in times of economic downturns. These sustained low levels of unemployment throughout its economic development can be partially attributed to the high growth rate of this period, but the unique nature of the Japanese employment system also contributed greatly to low unemployment. The characteristics of this system such as long-term job security, limited ports of entry and seniority wages resulted in reliance on internal employment adjustment as a mechanism to cope with changes in demand and technology.
The keiretsu conglomerates and their associated firms played an important role in employment adjustment in past recessions. In times of economic adversity troubled keiretsu firms would redeploy their employees by sending them to subsidiaries or related firms in other sectors. This practice was an important mechanism in sustaining relatively low unemployment throughout the oil crisis of the 1970s. The rise in energy prices during the oil crisis hit particularly hard on the manufacturing sector. The response of firms in this sector was to shed their employees to associated keiretsu firms in other sectors such as retail, construction and services. The shock absorbing effect of these sectors prevented widespread lay-offs by manufacturing firms (Chuma, 2002) . The current heisei recession differs in two respects. First, as we mentioned before, keiretsu ties between firms have weakened considerably since the 1980s, making it more difficult to call on subsidiaries and related firms to accept redundant personnel. Secondly, the impact of the heisei recession has been much broader across sectors than was the case during the oil crises of the 1970s. The service sector and the construction sector experienced a slow-down in growth during the 1990s and firms in these sectors were no longer to absorb excess labor from their affiliates in other sectors (Chuma, 2002) . Because employment adjustment took place predominantly within firms, alternative adjustment mechanisms such as adjustment through the open labor market are not well developed. However, as unemployment is rising due to personnel reductions in keiretsu firms and a strong rise in bankruptcies, these market mechanisms are becoming more important.
Employment policy in Japan has been in the past aimed at preventing unemployment through the use of subsidies to employers to maintain employment security. From the 1980s a gradual shift occurred towards policies that emphasize the development of skills and abilities of individual employees. However, experience with effective job placement and retraining of personnel to remedy mismatch unemployment is still limited. Also the relative underdevelopment of a secondary labor market forms an obstacle for smooth employment adjustments. Meanwhile, changes in technology have created a need for a flexible labor market for employees with specialized skills. However, switching of professional employees between firms has not been a common practice in Japan and many firms still do not have efficient recruitment systems for midcareer employees. During the 1990s these practices have been changing gradually, but they still reflect the strong reliance on the organizational principle as opposed to the decentralized market mechanisms in the allocation of human resources.
Other influences on unemployment
Unemployment levels have shown a steady increase during the 1980s and accelerated during the 1990s. However, employment levels have not shown a similar decline during this period. In fact, employment levels have risen for most of the 1980s and 1990s and only started to decline in the late 1990s. An important reason for this discrepancy can be traced back to the increased labor participation of women. Low unemployment levels in the past were partly related to the strong "discouraged worker" effect among women, who would withdraw from the labor market on becoming unemployed. Since the 1980s women have become increasingly active on the labor market resulting in a more than proportional increase of female employment levels.
The shift towards a more knowledge intensive economy involves entrepreneurial responses to changes in the economic environment in which old activities disappear as new economic activities are explored. This Schumpeterian dynamic takes two forms; on the one hand, small and new firms seek out new areas of economic value in new innovative industries. We showed that this mechanism has started to falter in Japan where few new start-ups are being established and where many obstacles remain for quick firm expansion. The second form involves the ability of existing small firms to revive established industries. Changes in technology have decreased the importance of scale economies in many industries and enable small firms to apply new technologies more quickly than larger firms. Also their ability to respond quickly to changes in demand adds to their ability to bring new life to existing sectors. We will shortly comment on whether this second dynamic is actually taking place in Japan.
Japanese small firms have a strong presence in the manufacturing industry. This is to a large degree the result of past government policies that have been characterized as highly interventionist.
Government stimulation of "sunrise" industries led to a specialization of industry in sectors such as electronics, car manufacturing, consumer durables and machine tools. Many of these sectors involve a great deal of medium-tech operations and it is in these industries where the impact of growing competitiveness of low-cost countries is felt most strongly. Small firms have managed to hold off the impact of global sourcing for some time because of the strong ties between keiretsu firms. We described how the weakening of these ties had led to the culling of many small businesses which negatively affected employment. Firms that survived the current recession responded to the crisis in a variety of ways.
A first response by small firms has been the reduction of costs. Many small firms have a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis their main contractor and are being pressured to bring costs down. While cutting the number of employees has been one way to achieve lower costs, moving production altogether to low-cost production sites in Asia has been another common practice for small firms in the 1990s. An interesting phenomenon among subcontracting firms is the fact that large manufacturing firms that moved their production overseas are urging their subcontractors to do the same. Many of them have set up shop in Southeast Asia and then supply their Japanese clients locally (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2002) . This focus on cost reduction has led to a reduction of employment in production as only management, marketing, research and design functions remain in Japan. This detachment between production and design could harm the long-term viability of this strategy. Innovation through continued quality improvements on the work floor has been a strength of Japanese firms, but with production moving overseas this process is interrupted.
A second response by firms has been to focus on specialized products or niche markets. Firms that previously were part of the mass production process now focus on making small runs of specialized products. Many firms now welcome difficult and custom orders that enable them to learn and upgrade their capabilities. However, in many cases the move towards more knowledge intensive operations has not been able to offset the loss of employment in mass production. Japan has not only been slow with respect to its transition from a managed economy to an entrepreneurial economy, but has also been late with respect to making the transition from a medium tech manufacturing economy to a more high-tech economy focused on the higher functions of the economy like design and services. The thesis of the entrepreneurial economy hypothesis as put forward by Audretsch and Thurik is that entrepreneurship can stimulate this transition. However, in reaility, the strong specialization of Japanese business in mass production industries limits the scope for firms to expand their business.
Conclusion
In this investigation we have looked at the relation between business ownership and unemployment. We showed that the Schumpeter effect of business ownership on unemployment is relatively weak in comparison with other OECD countries. Furthermore, we discussed that the transition of the managed economy to the entrepreneurial economy has contributed in several advanced economies to a reduction in unemployment. The entrepreneurial economy revives the original Schumpeterian notion of the entrepreneur at the heart of the economic process exploring new areas of economic growth. At present there are few signs that this transition to the entrepreneurial has taken place in Japan. An important impediment to this transition has been in fact the very success of Japan's unique economic structure in the past. The economic structure of Japan up to the 1970s reflected much of the vision of Schumpeter in his later work in which he describes innovation as being reduced to routine and in which highly bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations would lead (Schumpeter, 1944) . However, in Japan there was more at hand and Japanese firms managed to combine the traits of hierarchy with the flexibility of small firms by introducing new ways of thinking about inter-firm relations. The keiretsu model demonstrated that hierarchy and cooperation could be achieved without formal control through a quasi-market / quasi-organizational institutional arrangement. For small firms, this arrangement brought many benefits in the form of exchanges of knowledge and personnel and financial support. However, the exclusionist nature of the keiretsu system also produced a much more severe environment for firms operating outside the keiretsu world.
Since the economic environment has changed towards a world where ideas and knowledge are the cornerstones of the economic process, the need for a decentralized industrial structure in which new firms can discover new areas of economic value has grown. The keiretsu model that proved superior in the exploitation of economies of scale and scope lost its competitive strength and the large keiretsu firms became increasingly troubled. This led to the breakdown of existing structures demonstrated by weakening ties between keiretsu firms. The result in Japan was that keiretsu support for small firms evaporated without the existence of a true alternative industrial structure that supports small firms. Perhaps what has facilitated the fast transition towards the entrepreneurial economy in some countries has been the existence of a true market economy that could be easily geared to incorporate small firms. The reliance on the organization as a resource allocation mechanism obstructed the transition towards more open markets in which small firms have equal access to financial, human and technological resources.
The future of Japan's economy and its industrial structure is the subject of an intense debate. Some authors have called for a "system" change in which Japan should emulate the experience of countries that went through this transition successfully. The success story of Silicon Valley serves as an important inspiration for this strain of thought. Among others, Yonekura (1997) suggests that industrial policy could serve as a catalyst in creating an institutional structure similar to that of Silicon Valley which should exist parallel to the conventional manufacturing sector in which the keiretsu model still prevails as the most competitive model. Other thinkers have emphasized the potential of utilizing existing structures and favor augmentation of these structures to facilitate more dynamism. Cowling and Tomlinson (2002) for example stress the need to stimulate the existing structure of horizontal networks of small firms and enable small firms to become more independent from large firms. Both directions share the conception that entrepreneurship is the key to economic revival, as stressed in our introduction This investigation has taken the level of business ownership as a measure for entrepreneurship. In a more Schumpeterian view the concept of entrepreneurship encompasses more than business ownership alone and relates to the activity of establishing new combinations of means of production and is therefore most strongly related to the concept of innovation. Entrepreneurship in this definition takes account of other business strategies such as intrapreneurship or spin-off firms. During the 1990s large firms experimented with alternative methods of creating more dynamism and fluidity in the economy. These include internal corporate ventures, spin-off firms and other attempts in which large firms operate as financiers of new business. So far these efforts have shown very mixed results with some firms being very successful, while others having abandoned their attempts at intrapreneurship. The evolving relation between small and large firms is also demonstrated by the establishment of a variety of new forms of cooperation and networks. These networks take many forms and differ in composition including venture firms, conventional small firms, former sub-contractors, large keiretsu firms, academic research institutions, venture capital firms, banks and government organization.
Amidst continuous reference to the 1990s as a "lost decade", there has been important institutional change since the burst of the bubble which became even more pronounced after 1997. Perhaps the most important change has been the weakening of keiretsu ties and the fading of the segregation between keiretsu groups. Secondly, the experimentation with new business models has provided Japanese firms with a clearer vision on possible paths to increased competitiveness. Third, the public perception of large firms as champions of the economy has changed during the 1990s. The continuing struggling of large manufacturing firms corroded their prestige and has been replaced with an increasing appreciation of more entrepreneurial venture type businesses. An entrepreneurial community has emerged in which entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, progressive high-tech firms present an alternative to the bureaucratic life style in the large firms.
The government has only played a limited role in bringing about these changes and has been slow to facilitate the transition towards the entrepreneurial economy. The year 1999 can in this respect be considered as a turning point when the basic law on SMEs was amended and voiced a more dynamic role for small firms. Around the same time a large volume of new laws was passed aiming at facilitating new business creation, encourage cooperation between universities and business and stimulate innovation in the small business sector. Many of these laws were strongly inspired by American policies that had laid the foundations for the take-off of high-tech sectors in the U.S. in the 1980s. Government policy in Japan is balancing between two directions. On the one hand policies are based on social considerations and aim at mitigating the harsh impact of the changed economic conditions in the short run. The massive injections of public funds in the financial sector, bankruptcy prevention measures and extensive public loan policies towards SMEs are mostly aimed at preventing large scale destruction of the small business sector and retaining employment. On the other hand, policies aim in the long-term at creating an environment in which small firms and entrepreneurship will emerge as strengths of a new economy. With the lowest start-up rate of the OECD these policies have yet to prove their effectiveness.
Japan has a paradoxical history of both strong entrepreneurial dynamism as well as large firm dominance. The breakdown of the symbiosis between large and small firms in Japan has led to a breakdown of the Schumpeterian dynamic of creative destruction in which the small business sector is faced with imminent destruction. We will conclude on a positive note. Considering that Japan shows only a minor underestimation of the Schumpeter effect, there are good prospects for bringing down unemployment by stimulating business ownership. We identified several obstacles to growth of which some can be addressed through policy. Other obstacles are of an institutional and cultural nature and will be harder to change in the short run. The twin problems of unemployment and low growth confronting Japan can be countered if Japan manages to rekindle the old entrepreneurial dynamic by replacing the keiretsu structure with an institutional arrangement supporting small firms. Finally we believe that Japan's unique system of inter-firm relations and high risk aversity are likely to result in a very different approach to the challenges of the knowledge economy. Markets and non-hierarchical relations between firms are likely to be central elements of such a model. Industrial policy can facilitate this transition by creating equal chances for small and large firms and promoting horizontal cooperation between firms.
